If you’ve been following along with /sectionb you may have noted that, along with a couple of demonstrations, Dmitri described how an artificial “neural network” is used by the Section to get operational intel from the agency.

Since ChatGPT isn’t the novelty that it once was, let me leapfrog over it to suggest the existence of an artificial intelligence, specifically a neural network, that’s trained to recognize the correlations between a person’s psychic perceptions (whatever the m.o.), and verifiable real-world targets.

To put it another way, instead of being trained to answer queries based on natural language input, the neural net is trained on the input observed by an agent under controlled conditions favourable to psychic experiences. I like to think of it as something like “The Minority Report” but with significantly fewer enslaved mutants and far less glowing ooze.

The neural net then “translates” subsequent input to produce the most likely meaning of the experience based on previous training. In the /sectionb approach one size doesn’t fit all, hence the need for every agent to train their own net, but the individual approach is the same.

I may have riffed on the idea a bit but I’m certain that I didn’t come up with the concept. For the life of me I can’t remember where I’d first read about using a neural network in this way but I’ll be sure to post an update if/when I locate the source(s). Nevertheless, I thought it might be fun to demonstrate how such a technology could be not only possible but actually practical for use “in the field”.

So I slapped together AONN, a GPT-2 based, generically psi-spy-oriented generative neural network. It lives at the bottom of the /sectionb website (below the dossiers), and uses an apropos pseudo-terminal interface.

You run it by entering “/aonn” at the “>” prompt but keep in mind that the neural net and all associated code are nearly 140 megabytes in total so the initial startup (download) is a bit of a wait. The components will be cached by your browser for subsequent sessions but still …

Click here to launch the “terminal” in a new window.

I make no claims regarding the relevance or accuracy of the responses but despite a lot of seemingly coherent gibberish I’ve occasionally found the text to be eerily specific and lucid. If you suspect that you may have micro-PK abilities then this may be a good chance to test them. After all, the neural network is literally running exclusively within the machine in front of you (i.e. there is no remote server that generates the responses).

Considering that something generic like this can run in a shoddy terminal emulator inside the JavaScript virtual machine within a browser, it’s safe to say that a neural net that generates only two to three words would have no problem when used with something like the Section’s pod.

The portability of the pod’s rotary subwoofer (not to mention the power supply), is a bit more questionable but considering the mostly DYI nature of the technology I like to think that Dmitri overcame these obstacles. Maybe an AI suggested something.

I believe in continuing the tradition of cyberpunk in that fiction should be plausible. Since we’re now more-or-less living in the era of that ageing (and occasionally prophetic) genre, why not throw some psi in there and call it psiberpunk?

Regardless, I hope it makes for good reading while simultaneously suggesting that, to paraphrase Dmitri, there may yet be plenty that separates us from the machines.

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Coronation Park}

^{Ryerson Ave. near Queen West}

Colour me nostalgic but wasn’t it was around this time last year that the cops were looking for William, 31?

I don’t know if the fuzz got their man (?) but this time around they’re looking for 66-year-old Chester who is 5’9″ with stocky build, bald, and walks with a limp. He was last seen wearing a white shirt, blue jeans and blue and white shoes. Seem familiar? Maybe the following image will help:

For example … ye ole’ Rob Ford coke story. TCL broke that shit 15 months before it was ever mentioned in the mainstream:

Also there was the “lost” statue at University of Toronto, except that TCL managed to somehow capture Vickie a full 7 years before an official from Buckingham Palace even noticed that she’d gone “missing”:

Sure was a long time ago. Wonder what else has been “uncovered” since then … 😎

… that the fuzz is out in force today. Beware, Toronto!

Also, happy Canada Day or whatever.

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What and why? Excellent questions posed at Little Norway Park.

The annual Communications Security Establishment Canada report for 2024 to 2025 mentions Toronto a few times but mostly as an afterthought. I still think it’s worth a look though. You can download the report here or read it online.

It begins with an assurance by current Chief Caroline Xavier (she/her) that:

Equity, diversity, inclusion and accessibility inform everything we do and are essential to helping us deliver our mission.

Thank goodness I’m not running the place because my decisions would likely be informed by shit like effectiveness and adherence to/promotion of the Establishment’s mission:

The Communications Security Establishment Canada is Canada’s agency responsible for foreign signals intelligence, cyber operations, and cyber security.

We gather foreign signals intelligence to defend Canada’s national security. We keep the Government of Canada’s information secure. We work with industry and academia to protect Canadians from cyber threats.

Oddly, on page 46 under the sub-heading “Inclusivity in our external representation” (part of the “CSE is Growing and Learning” section), it is noted that:

We worked hard this year to embed EDIA into every facet of our work … including pronouns and a land acknowledgement

Yet there’s nary a land acknowledgement to be found in the entire report! Begs the question, if CSIS can do it then why can’t CSEC?

But not to worry, out of the 56 page report (of which 17 pages are fluff like full-page photos, decorative graphics, and section titles), CSEC has dedicated 4 full pages (plus generous sprinklings elsewhere), to advertising its initiatives on equity, diversity, inclusivity, and accessibility.

So if an acknowledgement or two slip through the cracks then … you know … shit happens. But I can see how shit like this can happen when I read things like:

Our diversity—whether in our backgrounds, skills, talents or motivations—is our strength.

Bringing in people with differing backgrounds, skills, and talents at a superficial level seems like a good idea but am I the only one to suspect that differing “motivations” could be somewhat problematic? Like, would it be considered a sufficiently diverse motivation if an applicant openly wished to destroy CSEC from within?

Maybe a uniquely diverse dearth of motivation is what produced the dearth of land acknowledgements in the report.

But let’s put all that aside for a moment and summarize what else the Establishment gets up to in their spare time. In late 2024 the report claims that CSEC detected and disrupted a foreign ransomware group within 48 hours. Also in 2024 CSEC boasts of helping to take RT off the air in Canada and of assisting in thwarting some botnets. In addition they spent some time providing intel for the military:

This year, we delivered timely intelligence for many named operations, including operations UNIFIER, REASSURANCE and HORIZON.

A number of the same foreign targets of CSEC are the same as those entities targeted by CSIS, namely:

• the PRC’s expansive and aggressive cyber program presents the most sophisticated and active state cyber threat to Canada today
• Russia’s cyber program furthers Moscow’s ambitions to confront and destabilize Canada and our allies
• Iran uses its cyber program to coerce, harass and repress its opponents, while managing escalation risks

While CSEC openly assists the governments of Ukraine and Latvia, domestically they seem more interested in keeping tabs on people:

In 2024 to 2025, following a series of cyber incidents targeting northern institutions, and with the Minister’s authorization, the Cyber Centre began proactively deploying sensors to territorial government IT assets in Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. These sensors detect malicious cyber activity in devices at the network perimeter and in the cloud. They are one of the Cyber Centre’s most important tools for defending systems of importance to the Government of Canada

Some people will say that these actions only target government infrastructure and help to increase security but those same people must also admit that simultaneously spreading the attack surface decreases security:

CSE operates Canada’s Top Secret Network (CTSN), a secure IT network used to collaborate and communicate at the Top Secret level. This year, CSE supported major site expansions for existing CTSN clients, including the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), PCO, Justice Canada and the RCMP, resulting in a 20% increase of deployed endpoints. In the upcoming year, CSE will onboard 3 new government departments to CTSN:

• Environment and Climate Change Canada
• Public Prosecution Service of Canada
• Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections

Why does Environment and Climate Change need access to top secret information? Maybe it’s for the same reasons that the government Covid jab contracts remain mostly secret.

Other than producing a lot of digital paperwork and giving presentations, it doesn’t seem like CSEC is very involved in most operational matters. Given how often the government ignores even this diminished function of the Establishment does not paint a rosy picture.

Between CSIS’ covert complaints and CSEC’s diverse distractions I don’t think it’s any wonder that Canada’s secret security apparatus relies heavily on the Five Eyes.

That being said, I’m pretty sure that it’s not the priority of the US, UK, Australia, or New Zealand to keep Canadians safe so I don’t find these or other partnerships reassuring. Something to keep in mind as the summer simmers and international intrigues increase.

It’s been over a couple of months since I last focused on the topic of espionage in Toronto and with the recent release of CSIS’ 2024 Public Report (download the PDF or read it online), it seems the perfect time to revisit the topic, especially since Toronto is mentioned a number of times.

I’m just gonna skip over the contentious introductory pleasantries and jump right to the heart of Dan Rogers‘ (the new CSIS boss), intro:

We continually re-evaluate and re-deploy resources to ensure we remain focused on the highest priorities in safeguarding Canada.

If this isn’t a smokescreen then the vibe I’m getting is that the Service is stretched a little thin and, if I’m being honest, it all sounds a little familiar.

Dan has been on the job for about 8 months at this point so if I’m to trust what he’s saying then I’d have to trust his opinion to be well-informed. He also claims:

As states and citizens alike adopt new technology, such as encryption and generative artificial intelligence, Canada must keep pace in understanding the varied impacts, opportunities and risks. These advancements can offer opportunities for Canada’s growth, while simultaneously equipping those who would seek to do us harm. In response, CSIS has implemented new processes and structures to review and shift resources as priorities emerge.

Again, there’s that “we can’t do it all” tone right at the end.

Also of concern is the claim that encryption and generative AI are new. While it’s true that generative AI is making spectacular leaps and bounds forward, for the Service it should’ve been on the radar for some time. Maybe that’s just my own assessment.

I’ve incorporated neural networks into /sectionb because the underlying concepts, at this point, have a lengthy history that predate most living people. In other words, it’s not really that new. You’d think the Service would have at least a couple of people on staff to keep track of this sort of stuff.

Moving on, Deputy Director of Operations Vanessa Lloyd notes:

In 2024, CSIS actively investigated espionage, foreign interference and terrorist threats, and for the first time in many years, also made concerted efforts to counter sabotage.

For the “first time in many years”? Yikes!

She also states:

In 2020, CSIS acknowledged that it had observed espionage and foreign interference levels not seen since the Cold War.

That’s reassuring. So is her grasp of “new” technologies:

This perspective remains true today as the threat environment evolves at an ever more rapid pace with the advent of new technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

Again, AI and quantum computing are not particularly new.

However, in her writing she notes a 1996 bust of two bona fide Russian spies, a 1999 investigation that “included CSIS”, a 2006 bust of a GTA terror cell (five of who resided in Toronto), the preemption of a bomb plot in 2023, the arrests of Ahmed and Mostafa Eldidi in 2024, and the interception of another bomb plot in the same year.

Extremism surrounding the Khalistan movement is specifically singled out as a long-term problem.

Other ostensible threats include “a variety of extremist beliefs, including militant accelerationism (advocating for the violent destruction of society), neo-Nazism, and satanic occultism”, but as far as CSIS knows these groups were “… not actively organizing a mass casualty attack.”

White supremacy is not mentioned once, which is quite a pivot from just a few years prior. With CSIS apparently playing cheerleader at that time, Public Safety Minister Bill Blair maintained that:

“There’s been an escalation, not only in rhetoric, but security and planning … countering this group [The Proud Boys] has become an important priority for the government of Canada.”

This was all happening at the same time as terms like “Sikh extremism” were being purposefully removed from government communications on extremist activities.

One thing that the report makes crystal clear is who CSIS is presently focused on, namely elements from:

PRC, India, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Pakistan

In the meantime:

… certain foreign states are attempting to interfere in Canada’s electoral processes and democratic institutions, and that foreign interference had an impact on the electoral ecosystem and has undermined public confidence in Canada’s democracy.

Presumably, when it comes to those “foreign states” it’s more than just interference:

CSIS assesses that RMVE [Religiously Motivated Violent Extremism] actors will continue to pose a domestic threat to Canada in 2025.

Specifically, as relates to Pakistan between 2018 and 2023:

… CSIS conducted a threat reduction measure to reduce the Pakistan foreign interference threat, which was later assessed as effective.

What is that “thread reduction measure” that was used between 2018 and 2023, you may ask?

CSIS has had the authority to undertake threat reduction measures (TRMs) since 2015. A TRM is an operational action that is intended to reduce a threat to the security of Canada as defined in Section 2 of the CSIS Act. Given its mandate and collection capabilities, CSIS is at times the best placed Government of Canada entity to confront a national security threat. Generally speaking, TRMs fall into three broad, but non-restrictive categories that include:

• Messaging: Directly or indirectly pushing information to a threat actor or person impacted by the threat in an attempt to influence their behaviour or reduce the threat.
• Leveraging: Disclosing information to a third party to enable them to take action, at their discretion, against the identified threat-related activities.
• Interference: Directly affecting the ability of a threat actor to engage in threat-related activity.

Basically, anything from an indirect suggestion to “directly affecting” the target … got it 😉.

Unfortunately, the feeling I’m left with is that the Canadian security forces are behind the times and behind the eight ball. So what now … corner pocket? 🎱😎